A Comparison of Mulla Sadra and David Hume on Rationality and Emotion in Moral Philosophy

Document Type : Original Article

Authors

1 Associate Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, Yasouj University, Yasouj, Iran

2 Master student in Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Yasouj University

3 Farhangian University of Hamedan"

prt/prt.2026.73413.1020

Abstract

This study, employing a library-based and descriptive method, examines the relationship between reason and emotion in the moral philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā and David Hume, with a focus on the epistemological and ontological foundations of these two philosophers. It addresses the fundamental difference in their approaches to explaining the origin and status of moral judgments. Relying on his empiricist philosophy, Hume regards reason merely as an instrument for discerning relations among ideas and matters of fact, and maintains that reason alone cannot motivate moral action; rather, moral judgments arise from inner human sentiments and emotions. His famous dictum that “reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions” indicates the central role of emotions in his moral system. In contrast, Mullā Ṣadrā, within his transcendent theosophy (al-ḥikmah al-muta‘āliyah), does not confine reason to the domain of abstract concepts; instead, he considers it a level of existence capable of attaining intuitive knowledge of truths and moral principles. For Mullā Ṣadrā, moral virtue is a firmly rooted disposition of the soul, achieved through rational and practical discipline, in which reason plays a guiding role.

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History

  • Receive Date: 05 July 2026
  • Revise Date: 05 August 2026
  • Accept Date: 09 August 2026

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