نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 دانشیار فلسفه، گروه فلسفه، دانشکده ادبیات و علوم انسانی،دانشگاه یاسوج،یاسوج،ایران
2 دانشجوی کارشناسی ارشد فلسفه و کلام اسلامی دانشگاه یاسوج، یاسوج، ایران
3 استادیار گروه معارف اسلامی، دانشگاه فرهنگیان، همدان، ایران
چکیده
کلیدواژه‌ها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
The problem of the relationship between rationality and emotion in moral philosophy is one of the most fundamental questions that sets two different philosophical traditions against each other. This article undertakes a comparative study of the views of Mullā Ṣadrā and David Hume on this issue. Hume, with his empiricist approach, regards reason merely as an instrument for discerning relations among matters and grounds ethics in human sentiments and passions. His famous dictum that “reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions” expresses the view that moral judgments are not a species of rational truths but rather sentiments of approval or disapproval. In contrast, Mullā Ṣadrā, relying on the Transcendent Philosophy (al-Hikmah al-Mutaʿāliyah), considers reason to be an existential reality and regards intellectual perceptions as arising from inward intuition and disclosure. In his philosophical system, rationality is not only not in conflict with emotion, but authentic emotions themselves are products of intellectual and intuitive understanding of the order of existence. The findings of this research demonstrate that in Mullā Ṣadrā's thought, moral virtues are firmly rooted dispositions of the soul and belong to the category of intellectual and intuitive perceptions, whereas Hume evaluates virtues solely on the basis of their utility and their capacity to produce collective pleasure. These two approaches offer fundamentally different pictures of the relation between reason and emotion in ethics, a comparison that can be fruitful for contemporary debates in moral philosophy.
کلیدواژه‌ها [English]
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